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The Iowa GamblingTask (IGT) is in many respects the gold standard for demonstrating deci-
sion making in drug using groups. However, it is not clear how basic task properties such
as the frequency and magnitude of rewards and losses affect choice behavior in drug users
and even in healthy players. In this study, we used a variant of the IGT, the Soochow Gam-
bling Task (SGT), to observe choice behavior in opiate users and healthy decision makers
in a task where reward frequency is not confounded with the long-term outcome of each
alternative. In both opiate users (n= 26) and healthy controls (n= 27), we show that reward
frequency strongly inﬂuences choice behavior in the IGT and SGT. Neither group showed
a consistent preference across tasks for alternatives with good long-term outcomes, but
rather, subjects appeared to prefer alternatives that win most frequently.We interpret this
as evidence to suggest that healthy players perform better than opiate users on the IGT
because they are able to utilize gain–loss frequencies to guide their choice behavior on the
task.This challenges the previous notion that poorer performance on the IGT in drug users
is due to an inability to be guided by future consequences.
Keywords: Iowa Gambling Task, Soochow Gambling Task, choice behavior, decision-making, opiate users, drug
users
INTRODUCTION
Illicit drug use is a “risky” activity associated with negative conse-
quences such as family and work disruption, overdose, addiction,
and accidents from intoxication. Given such risks, an important
question is why some people engage in this behavior. This ques-
tion has prompted research into the thought processes underlying
decisions under risk in drug users. Many ﬁndings indicate that
drug users, when viewed as a group, are more sensitive to a range
of rewarding stimuli and also less sensitive to loss (Rogers and
Robbins, 2001; Bechara, 2005). In addition, drug users appear to
have difﬁculty learning from past negative experiences to make
more beneﬁcial decisions in the future (Grant et al., 2000; Ersche
et al., 2005; Brand et al., 2008). Of course, decisions involving risk
are highly variable, and the type, value, and likelihood of rewards
and losses can all inﬂuence choice. Thus, to understand why drug
users takemore risks, it is necessary to describe how factors related
to learning, reward, and loss inﬂuence choice behavior. To this end,
laboratory decision tasks allow a level of control not possible in
the “real world,” and several tasks are now widely used to study
decisions under risk in drug users (CGT: Rogers et al., 1999; IGT:
Bechara and Damasio, 2002; BART: Lejuez et al., 2002).
The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara et al., 1997) is arguably
the most popular decision task used in studies of clinical samples.
Players choose from four “decks of cards” over a series of trials,
with each selection resulting in a monetary reward and occasion-
ally a monetary loss. A key feature of this task is that unbeknownst
to the player, the decks vary in their win/loss frequencies and ﬁnal
outcomes. Players must make selections, experience the outcomes,
and then develop their preferences through this experience. For a
player to ﬁnish the IGT with a positive balance, the player must
overcome an initial preference for decks that have large gains but
large losses (with overall net losses), and switch their preference
to decks that have relatively small rewards but less severe losses,
ending with an overall net gain.
A typical ﬁnding in the IGT literature is that both drug users
and healthy non-users prefer deckswith net losses in the beginning
stages of the task, but only healthy non-users shift their preference
to the decks with the net gains as the task progresses (Bechara and
Damasio, 2002; Stout et al., 2004, 2005). This ﬁnding suggests that
drug users (unlike non-users) fail to learn from experience that
the decks with large gains actually yield even larger losses, result-
ing in the negative expected value of the losing IGT decks. Instead,
they continue to show a preference for losing decks either because
they over-attend to the frequent large gains and under-attend to
large losses, or because they are not attracted to the decks in which
gains (and losses) are both smaller (Grant et al., 2000; Ersche et al.,
2005).
To date, the most common method for analyzing IGT per-
formance is by combining selections from decks with negative
expected value (decks A and B) and decks with positive expected
value (decks C and D; Bechara et al., 1994; Grant et al., 2000).
However, pairing decks in this way obscures the inﬂuence of win
frequency on IGT performance, because decks within each pairing
differ in terms of win frequency. This issue was ﬁrst described by
(Chiu et al., 2008). In studies where IGT decks have been analyzed
individually, drug users and non-users show a clear preference for
decks with high frequency wins (Verdejo-Garcia et al., 2007). Drug
users perform poorly because they prefer the high frequency win
deck with higher risk (Deck B). Non-users start the task prefer-
ring this same deck, but as the task progresses, they typically shift
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their preference to the other high frequency win deck, which has
relatively lower wins on every selection but also lower magnitude
losses. So, although drug users and controls appear to prefer fre-
quent win decks in the IGT, it is difﬁcult to gage the strength of
this factor’s inﬂuence on decision making in each group because
players have the option to switch from a high frequency win deck
with negative expected value to a high frequency win deck with
positive expected value. Would healthy decision makers develop a
preference for decks with positive expected value in the IGT if a
high frequency win alternative was not available?
To clarify the relative importance of expected value and win
frequency on healthy decision makers’ choices, Chiu et al. (2008)
designed the Soochow Gambling Task (SGT). The key difference
between the SGT and IGT is that both SGT decks with positive
expected values have lower frequency wins than decks with negative
expected values. Thus, in the SGT there is a negative correlation
between expected value andwin frequencywhich enables studying
the relative inﬂuence of each factor on performance of the task.
The selection patterns observed by Chiu et al. (2008) show that
healthy players had no preference for decks with positive expected
value, but rather, they preferred decks with high frequency wins
despite those decks having negative expected value. In the SGT
at least, healthy decision makers make what would be considered
poor decisions overall, and win frequency appears to be a stronger
inﬂuence than expected value. Applying the same interpretation
to these ﬁndings as has been applied numerous times to the IGT;
healthy decisionmakers appear insensitive to future consequences
(Ahn et al., 2008; Chiu et al., 2008).
Why do healthy decision makers prefer high frequency win
decks in the IGT and SGT? Research comparing descriptive and
experienced based choices may provide some clues. In contrast
to descriptive choices, where decision makers tend to overvalue
low probability outcomes, decisionmakers tend to undervalue low
probability outcomes when their decisions are based on feedback
from past outcomes (Barron and Leider, 2009; Barron and Lei-
der, 2009). That is, for experienced based choices, decision makers
tend to prefer alternatives with a higher chance of being rewarded,
even when the magnitude of the reward is smaller (Barron and
Erev, 2003; see Rakow and Newell, 2010 for review). This may
explain the pattern observed in the IGT and SGT,where both drug
users and controls appear to prefer decks with the highest proba-
bility of winning (i.e., high frequency win decks). In the IGT, one
high frequency win deck, Deck B, has negative expected value and
the other, Deck D, has positive expected value. In the SGT, both
high frequency win decks have negative expected value,whichmay
explain why healthy players fail to develop a preference for decks
with positive expected value as the task progresses.
Thus, the SGT can help to clarify the relative importance
of factors such as expected value, win frequency and wins/loss
magnitude on drug users’ choices. And, given the difﬁculty of
disentangling the inﬂuence of expected value, win frequency and
sensitivity to risk in the IGT, a study that includes both the IGT and
SGTwill improve the accuracy in interpreting differences between
drug users and non-users and broaden the available data upon
which to base interpretations of decision characteristics in drug
users. To maximize the possibility of seeing differences between
drug users and controls in these two tasks, we examined opiate
users in outpatient treatment rather than a group of milder drug
users from the community. In both the IGT and SGT, we expected
drug users to prefer high frequencywin deckswith highmagnitude
wins and losses, yielding overall losses in the IGT and in the SGT.
MATERIAL AND METHODS
SUBJECTS
We recruited 26 drug users (M= 34.23 years, SD= 8.79; male,
21) from Turning Point Alcohol and Drug Centre, a commu-
nity outpatient service in inner Melbourne. These participants
were either currently using illicit opiates (e.g., heroin) and/or
taking prescribed opiate substitution medication (methadone,
buprenorphine). Participants were asked to abstain from illicit
drugs and alcohol for 12 h prior to the testing session (exclud-
ing opiate substitutionmedication). If participants reported using
alcohol or drugs less than 12 h before the test session, or had
a blood alcohol level reading above 0.05mg/kg on arrival, their
test session was postponed for at least 1 day. Test sessions were
postponed for at least 2 days if participants arrived in a visi-
bly intoxicated state or if they were experiencing acute with-
drawal symptoms. We also recruited 27 control participants
(M= 35 years, SD= 10.44; male, 22) using ﬂiers and newspaper
advertisements. Control participants had not used illicit drugs
in the previous 6months, had no history drug or alcohol prob-
lems, and had a blood alcohol level <0.05mg/kg conﬁrmed
on arrival to the test session. Screening questions were used to
ensure that participants from both groups had no history of psy-
chosis. All participants provided written informed consent, and
the Monash University Human Ethics Committee approved all
study procedures.
Groupswerematchedonage, t (51)= 0.29,p = 0.77 andgender,
χ2(1, N= 53)< 0.01, p = 0.95 (see Table 1), but drug users had
lower education, t (51)= 2.83, p< 0.01, higher unemployment,
χ2(1, N= 53) 16.89, p< 0.001 and reported more incidences
of head injury requiring hospitalization compared to non-users,
χ2(1, N= 53) 9.73, p< 0.01 (Table 1).
STUDY PROCEDURE
Participants from both groups underwent the same testing proce-
dure in a single test session. During the initial part of the session,
demographic characteristics, medical information, and substance
use histories were recorded. A battery of computerized decision
making tasks and a series of questionnaires followed. Testing took
between 2 and 3 h for each participant, and was typically longer
for drug users because their substance use histories were more
extensive. Only a subset of the data collected is reported here.
CHARACTERIZATION OF PARTICIPANTS
Substance use
Lifetime substance use and frequency of use over 30 days prior
to testing were recorded using the drug use section of the addic-
tion severity index (ASI;Mclellan et al., 1980).We also determined
alcohol related problems over the past 12months (e.g., health, rela-
tionship, occupational, legal) using the Michigan Alcohol Screen-
ing Test (MAST; Selzer, 1971), and illicit drug related problems
using the Drug Abuse Screening Test (DAST; Skinner, 1982). The
MAST and DAST probe alcohol and drug related problems over
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Table 1 | Summary of demographic, mood, personality, and substance use variables.
Controls (n=27) Drug users (n=26)
M (SD) % M (SD) %
Age 35 (10.44) 34.23 (8.79)
Gender (male) 81.49 80.67
Est. IQ (WTAR) 35.15 (8.23) 32.42 (10.22)
Education (years)* 14.74 (2.93) 12.25 (3.46)
Employed* 66.67 11.54
Head inj. requiring hospital* 3.70 38.46
Mood/anxiety dis.* 18.51 53.85
Anxiety (past week; HADS)* 5.41 (2.42) 9.73 (3.66)
Depression (past week; HADS)* 3.11 (3.09) 7.50 (3.42)
Impulsivity (Eysenck I7)* 5.41 (3.65) 10.46 (4.62)
Antisociality (MMPI-PD)* 15.52 (4.50) 24.44 (6.31)
Alcohol
Past month use 59.26 59.26
Past month use (numb. days) 3.22 (5.77) 7.42 (9.12)
Lifetime use (years) 11.70 (10.78) 13.69 (8.69)
Problems (MAST) 0.44 (0.66) 8.23 (6.71)
Tobacco
Never 74.10 3.85
Quit 11.11 0
Current (occasional) 7.41 0
Current (daily) 7.41 96.15
Cannabis
Past month use 0 42.31
Past month use (numb. days) 0 8.15 (11.75)
Lifetime use (years) 1.74 (5.35) 8.81 (7.84)
Amphetamine
Past month use 0 23.10
Past month use (numb. days) 0 0.50 (1.14)
Lifetime use (years) 0 5.04 (6.45)
Heroin
Past month use 0 73.10
Past month use (numb. days) 0 5.85 (6.44)
Lifetime use (years) 0 9.35 (6.75)
Prescr. Methadone (current)
Past month use 0 46.15
Past month use (numb. days) 0 13.69 (15)
Lifetime use (years) 0 1.96 (3.23)
Parent hist. (sub. problems)* 3.70 50
Illicit drug problems (DAST) 0.30 (0.61) 14.54 (4.34)
*P<0.05.
the past 12months through a series of questions requiring a yes/no
response. Parental history of substance use problems was also
recorded.
As expected, the opiate user’s group scored higher on the DAST,
t (51)=−16.58, p< 0.001 and MAST, t (51)=−5.89, p< 0.001
compared to the control group. They also used a range of drugs
for longer and more frequently over their lifetime (including
alcohol and tobacco; see Table 1) and were more likely to have
a parent with a substance use problem, χ2(1, N= 53) 14.60,
p< 0.001.
ESTIMATED IQ, MOOD, AND PERSONALITY
Weestimatedparticipant IQusing theWechslerTest of AdultRead-
ing (WTAR; Wechsler, 2001). The WTAR requires participants
to read a list of 50 words to the experimenter, with word difﬁ-
culty increasing further down the list. The number of correctly
pronounced words is a strong predictor of general IQ (Wech-
sler, 2001). We also determined recent symptoms of depression
and anxiety over the previous week using the Hospital Anxiety
and Depression Scales (HADS; Zigmond and Snaith, 1983). The
HADS is self-administered and has 16 questions (8 for anxiety
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and 8 for depression). Each question has four response lev-
els scored from 0 (e.g., not at all) to 3 (e.g., deﬁnitely). Total
scores range from 0 to 21 for each subscale, with higher scores
indicating greater anxiety/depression symptomatology. We also
assessed “rash impulsivity” using the Eysenck Impulsiveness Scale
of the Eysenck Impulsivity Venturesomeness and Empathy Scales
(Eysenck et al., 1985). The Impulsiveness scale is self-administered,
and requires participants to answer 19 yes/no questions. Scores
range between 0 and 19, with higher scores indicating greater
impulsive tendencies. We assessed antisocial tendencies using the
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, psychopathic devi-
ate subscale (MMPI-PD; Butcher et al., 1989). The MMPI-PD is
a self-administered questionnaire consisting of 50 true/false ques-
tions. Scores range between 0 and 50,with higher scores indicating
greater antisocial tendencies.
Drug users and non-users had comparable WTAR scores,
t (51)= 1.07,p = 0.29 but drug users reported higher symptoms of
depression, t (51)=−4.90, p< 0.001 and anxiety, t (51)=−5.09,
p< 0.001 (HADS) and were more likely to report a history of
mood disorder compared to the control group, χ2(1, N= 53)
7.19, p< 0.01. Drug users also had higher self-reported impulsiv-
ity (Eysenck I7), t (51)=−4.43, p< 0.001 and higher antisociality
(MMPI-PD scale), t (51)=−5.90, p< 0.001.
DECISION MAKING TASKS: THE IGT AND THE SGT
In the IGT (Bechara et al., 1997), players select from four “decks
of cards” over a series of trials. On each trial, players receive a
monetary reward or loss following their selection, with the fre-
quency and magnitude of wins and losses differing across decks.
Players are not given any information about the decks. Instead,
they must learn from experience to choose from the decks that
will maximize net return overall. Decks A and B have a large ﬁxed
reward ($1.00), and occasional large losses ($2.5 to 12.50). Over 10
selections, these decks return a net loss of $2.50 (Table 2). Decks
C and D return a relatively small ﬁxed reward ($0.50) compare
to decks A and B, but also relatively small occasional losses ($0.25
to $2.50). Over 10 selections, these decks return a net reward of
$2.50 (Table 2). Therefore, in order to ﬁnish the game on a positive
balance, participants must make a higher proportion of selections
from decks C and D overall.
Most studies using the IGT assess the total proportion (or num-
ber) of“good”deck selections over the course of the task to evaluate
performance. However, recent ﬁndings suggest that combining
decks for analysis can mask important patterns unique to each
deck (Dunn et al., 2006; Yechiam et al., 2008). For this reason,
we focused on individual deck selections and did not combine
decks based on long-term outcome as some previous studies have.
Given that changes can occur in preference as player experience the
payoffs of each deck, we also analyzed changes in the mean pro-
portion of selections from each deck a function of task progression
(blocks 1–6).
The SGT (Chiu et al., 2008) is also computerized, requiring
players to choose from four “decks of cards” over a series of tri-
als. Like the IGT, players are not given any information about the
decks. Two decks (A and B) have a ﬁxed reward every selection
(A, $1.00; B, $0.50) and a ﬁxed loss every ﬁve selections (A, $5.25;
B, $3.25)1. Ten selections from these decks results in a net loss of
$2.50 (Table 2). The two other decks (C and D) have a ﬁxed loss
every selection (C, $1.00; D, $0.50) and a ﬁxed reward every ﬁve
selections (C, $5.25; D, $3.25). Ten selections from these decks
results in a net reward of $2.50 (Table 2). Thus, unlike the IGT,
decks that win frequently in the SGT (A, B) have a negative long-
term value. We used the same approach to analyze SGT selections
as described above for the IGT.
For both tasks, players began the game with a starting bal-
ance of $20.00 and received any money earned above this balance
at the end of the task (120 trials). Players could not lose any
money. The total balance was updated on-screen after every selec-
tion and players were also provided with feedback about the
net change in balance every 20 trials (6 blocks). Each trial was
player-initiated, and there were no time restrictions. Decks were
positioned on the computer screen, from left to right, randomly
1Note that in contrast to the IGT, which presents wins and losses (when they occur)
separately on each trial, in the SGT, only a net win or loss is presented.
Table 2 |The pay-off distributions of the Iowa GamblingTask and Soochow GamblingTask for the first 10 trials, adapted fromAhn et al. (2008).
IGT A B C D SGT A B C D
Expected value of 10 trials −$2.50 −$2.50 $2.50 $2.50 Expected value of ﬁve trials −$2.50 −$2.50 $2.50 $2.50
Gain on every trial $1.00 $1.00 $0.50 $0.50 Gain on every trial $1.00 $0.50 −$1.00 −$0.50
Loss on each trial Loss on each trial
Trial 1 −$1.00 −$0.50
Trial 2 −$1.00 −$0.50
Trial 3 −$1.00 −$0.50
Trial 4 −$1.00 −$0.50
Trial 5 −$5.25 −$3.25
Trial 6 −$1.50 −$0.25 −$1.00 −$0.50
Trial 7 −$2.00 −$0.75 −$1.00 −$0.50
Trial 8 −$2.50 −$0.50 −$1.00 −$0.50
Trial 9 −$3.00 −$0.50 −$1.00 −$0.50
Trial 10 −$3.50 $12.50 −$0.50 −$2.50 −$5.25 −$3.25
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across participants, and the order of tasks was counterbalanced
between participants.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Demographic, substance use, mood, and personality measures
were compared between groups using two-tailed independent
samples t -tests for continuous variables (e.g., age, education) and
chi square tests for categorical variables (e.g., gender, employment
status).We computed separate repeatedmeasuresANOVAs for the
SGT and IGT to analyze the mean proportion of selections from
each deck (A, B, C, D) across the 6 task blocks (repeated mea-
sures). Group was included as a between-subjects factor in this
analysis (drug users, controls). Paired samples t -tests were used
to explore signiﬁcant (p< 0.05) main effects of deck, and one-
way ANOVAs to explore interactions between deck and group.
Interaction effects involving the factor of task block were explored
using repeated measures ANOVAs. Greenhouse–Geisser adjusted
degrees of freedom (and p values) are reported when Mauchly’s
Test of Sphericity was signiﬁcant.
To further explore the inﬂuence of win frequency, magnitude,
and expected value on deck preference,we also examined Pearson’s
correlations between the number of selections from each deck in
the IGT with the decks in the SGT across a combined sample
of drug users and controls. We expected decks with similar win
frequency and win/loss magnitude characteristics would be more
strongly related than other decks in the same task, but not decks
with the same expected values.
RESULTS
IGT AND SGT DECK SELECTIONS
We analyzed SGT selections to determine how deck preferences
developed during the task in each group. We found a main effect
of deck in the SGT, F(3,153)= 9.17, p< 0.001, but no inter-
action between deck and group, F(3,153)= 0.17, p> 0.05, deck
and block, F(15,765)= 1.24, p> 0.05, or deck, block, and group,
F(15,765)= 1.12, p> 0.05. This indicates that both groups devel-
oped similar preferences and did not change those preferences
over the course of the task. Both groups overwhelmingly pre-
ferred high frequency win deck A (bad long-term outcome) to all
other decks [deck B, t (52)= 4.58, p< 0.001, deck C, t (52)= 3.05,
p< 0.01, deck D, t (52)= 5.13, p< 0.001; Figure 1].We also found
a trend for both groups to prefer high frequency win deck (deck
B; bad long-term outcome) over low frequency win deck D (good
long-term outcome), t (52)= 1.85, p= 0.07 (Figures 1B,D).
For the IGT, our aim was to replicate previous ﬁndings (Stout
et al., 2004, 2005),both in terms of initial preferences in each group
(deck B) and changes in preference during the task (no change in
substance users, healthy controls switch to deck D). We found a
main effect of deck, F(3,153)= 25.20, p< 0.001 and an interac-
tion between deck and group, F(3,153)= 4.58, p< 0.05, and deck,
block, and group, F(15,765)= 1.66, p = 0.05. This ﬁnding repli-
cates previous studies in that drug users and controls developed
different deck preferences and that these preferences changed dur-
ing task in a group speciﬁc way (Grant et al., 2000; Verdejo-Garcia
et al., 2007; Verdejo-Garcia and Perez-Garcia, 2007). Interesting
FIGURE 1 | Mean proportion of SGT selections from deck A (A) deck B (B) deck C (C) deck D (D) from blocks 1–6. Each block=20 trials. Error bars 95%
CI. *P <0.05.
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effects were in high frequency decks B and D. The controls
made more deck D selections than opiate users F(1,52)= 5.20,
p< 0.05 (Figure 2D). For controls, there was a signiﬁcant increase
in deck D selections across the task F(5,130)= 2.74, p< 0.05,
suggesting learning in this group, whereas in opiate users there
appears to be no change as the task progressed, F(5,125)= 0.52,
p> 0.05. In contrast, controls made signiﬁcantly fewer selections
from deck B compared to opiate users F(1,52)= 6.52, p< 0.05,
and although deck B selections appeared to decrease slightly
across the task in controls and increase slightly in opiate users,
this interaction was not signiﬁcant [F(5,255)= 1.813, p> 0.05;
Figure 2B]. deck A selections were comparable between groups,
F(1,52)= 0.02, p> 0.05, as were deck C selections,F(1,52)= 0.44,
p> 0.05 (Figures 2A,C).
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN IGT AND SGT DECK SELECTIONS
Consistent with the reasoning behind the SGT (i.e., deck expected
value does not guide choice), selections from SGT decks with
positive expected value (C, D “good decks”) were not associated
with selections from IGT decks with positive expected value (C,
D “good decks”), r(53)= 0.06, p> 0.05 (Figure 3B). In contrast,
we found correlations between decks with similar win frequency
FIGURE 2 | Mean proportion of IGT selections from deckA (A) deck B (B) deck C (C) deck D (D) from blocks 1–6. Each block=20 trials. Error bars 95% CI.
*P <0.05.
FIGURE 3 | Scatter plots showing the association between mean proportion of IGT and SGT selections for IGT deck B and SGT deck A (A) IGT deck C
and SGT deck D (B) and IGT deck C and SGT deck A (C).
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and win/loss magnitude characteristics. Participants who selected
more from deck A in the SGT (high frequency win, high magni-
tude win/loss) also tended to select more from deck B in the IGT
(alsohigh frequencywin,highmagnitudewin/loss), r(53)= 0.251,
p< 0.07 (Figure 3A). In addition, participants who selected more
from SGT deck A tended to make fewer selections from IGT deck
C (low win frequency, low magnitude win/loss), r(53)=−0.530,
p< 0.001 (Figure 3C). However, IGT deck D selections were not
related to SGT deck B selections, despite both decks being high
frequency win, low magnitude win/loss, r(53)= 0.090, p> 0.05.
DISCUSSION
Many studies have found that drug users perform poorly in the
IGT,but it is unclear how the basic properties of this task are related
to choice behavior. Our aimwas to identify patterns of responding
across the IGT and SGT in relation to each deck’s expected value,
its win frequency and win/loss magnitude. Our data indicate that
opiate users and healthy controls are strongly inﬂuenced by win
frequency, with both groups preferring high frequency win decks
to low frequency win decks in the IGT and SGT.
Although the deck property of expected value has been the pri-
mary focus of most previous studies (Bechara et al., 1994, 1997,
2000) its inﬂuence on choice behavior was not obvious. Similar
to Chiu et al. (2008) and Ahn et al. (2008), healthy controls pre-
ferred decks with positive expected value in the IGT, but negative
expected value decks in the SGT. In addition, selections fromdecks
with the same expected value were not correlated across the IGT
and SGT. Thus, if expected value does inﬂuence choice behav-
ior in healthy decision makers, as suggested in previous literature
(Bechara et al., 1997), the effect does not appear to generalize from
the IGT to the SGT.
One possibility raised by Chiu et al. (2008) is that controls pre-
fer decks with positive expected value in the IGT because they do
not have a lower win frequency. The SGT reveals that when behav-
ior based on win frequency and expected value lead to different
choices, win frequency is a stronger inﬂuence on choice behavior
in this context (Ahn et al., 2008; Chiu et al., 2008). Our study con-
ﬁrms this ﬁnding and extends it to a group of drug users. Across
both tasks, we found only one difference between opiate users and
controls. In the SGT, both groups preferred SGT Deck A (high
frequency win, high magnitude win/loss, negative expected value)
and did not learn tomaximize their earnings by shifting their pref-
erence to decks with positive expected value (C, D). In the IGT,
both groups preferred Deck B early on (high frequency win, high
magnitude win/loss, negative expected value), but only controls
shifted their preference to Deck D in the later stages of the task
(high frequency, low reward/loss magnitude).
To explain this pattern of results, we need to consider the win
frequency and win/loss magnitude characteristics of IGT decks B
and D. Deck D returns half the reward per selection compared to
Deck B ($0.5 vs. $1), but has less harsh occasional losses ($2.50 vs.
$12.50). Thus, it is likely that controls weremotivated to shift their
preference to Deck D after experiencing the large losses associated
with Deck B. So why did not drug users also shift their prefer-
ence from Deck B to Deck D? Previous studies suggest that drug
users are more sensitive to rewarding stimuli and less sensitive to
loss/punishment (Rogers and Robbins, 2001; Stout et al., 2004,
2005; Bechara, 2005). Thus drug users may have been relatively
more attracted to the large rewards associated with Deck B, and
less affected by this deck’s large losses. This combination would
reduce the likelihood of drug users shifting their preference to a
lower paying deck with the same win frequency.
To understand why controls shifted their preference in the IGT
but not in the SGT, it may help to consider IGT decks again. In the
IGT, when players shift from Deck B to Deck D, they forgo 50% of
the reward (per selection), but also get an 80% reduction in loss. In
the SGT,when players shift fromDeckA toDeck B, they forgo 50%
of the reward, but only get a 38% reduction in loss. We can only
speculate, but it could be that players are aware of this trade-off on
some level and decide that it is not worth it in the SGT. This is fun-
damentally different to the suggestion that healthy controls learn
the expected value of decks and shift their preference accordingly.
Indeed, given that decisionmakers have been shown to undervalue
low probability alternatives in experience-based choices (Barron
and Leider, 2009; Barron and Yechiam, 2009), it is not surprising
that players strongly preferred alternatives in both tasks that had
the highest probability of winning. Furthermore, the correlation
between high frequency win decks across the IGT and SGT found
in this study, suggests that the strength of this preference is robust
across related decision situations. This does not appear to be the
case for the factor of expected value.
Of course, this is the ﬁrst study to evaluate IGT and SGT
performance together in drug users, so replication in a larger,
more representative sample is required. Our sample of drug users
also had high levels of head injury requiring hospitalization and
high levels of anxiety and depression. These characteristics could
reasonably affect decision processes, particularly the evaluation
of reward and loss which appear to be important processes for
understanding why choice behavior differs between drug users
and non-users in the IGT Nevertheless, head injury, anxiety and
depression are common characteristics in this population and in
many respects inseparable from drug use disorders (Rogers and
Robbins, 2001). We are encouraged however by our replication of
previous IGT ﬁndings in cannabis users (Fridberg et al., 2010),
which indicates that our sample was not unique in terms of their
decision making abilities or tendencies.
In conclusion, given the importance of tasks such as the IGT for
understanding decision making in clinical samples such as those
in treatment for drug use, we know surprisingly little about how
the basic properties of this task inﬂuence choice behavior. Our
data indicated that opiate users and healthy controls are similarly
inﬂuenced by win frequency across the IGT and SGT, but appear
to value wins and losses differently, at least in the IGT. This may
explain divergent choice behavior observed between groups later
in the IGT. Future studies should determine how individual dif-
ferences in the valuation of reward and loss affect choice behavior
in this context.
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